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ARTICLES
THE ENTANGLEMENT TEST OF THE
RELIGION CLAUSES-A
TEN YEAR ASSESSMENT
Kenneth F. Ripple*
INTRODUCTION
During its 1979 Term, the Supreme Court of the United
States passed the ten-year mark in its employment of the so-called
"excessive entanglement" test of the religion clauses. During the
past decade this concept has developed from a simple expression
of one of the accepted policy considerations underlying interpreta-
tion of the religion clauses to an identifiably separate test in estab-
lishment clause analysis. In this latter role, the Court has
employed the concept to accomplish two distinct, although analyt-
ically related, objectives. First, it has sought to identify those legal
and administrative relationships between civil and religious au-
thorities which are -likely to cause religiously-based discord or
lead to an unacceptable degree of governmental support for reli-
gion. It has also attempted to isolate those broader religious-civil
relationships which might well lead to religiously-based political
divisiveness in our society. In the last several Terms of Court,
moreover, the Justices have explicitly incorporated this concept
into free exercise analysis. There it has been employed both as an
important governmental interest to be weighed against free exer-
cise claims and as a measure of the free exercise claim itself.
Anniversaries are traditional occasions for reflection and re-
assessment. This particular anniversary presents an especially
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. A.B., 1965, Fordham Univer-
sity; J.D., 1968, University of Virginia; LL.M., 1972, The George Washington Univer-
sity. The author expresses his appreciation to his colleagues Dr. Donald Kommers
and Dr. Charles Rice for their valuable suggestions and to his former student assist-
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suitable occasion for such critical evaluation since, during this last
Term, the Court itself noted quite candidly that, at least with re-
spect to the establishment clause, it plans to engage in such a reas-
sessment at its own conference table. I The purpose of this Article
is to contribute to this reappraisal by addressing three essential
aspects of any such doctrinal re-evaluation. First, the Article will
critically evaluate the impact of the entanglement concept on the
jurisprudence of the religion clauses. 2 Next, it will identify the
practical problems inherent in the implementation of this test. 3
Lastly, the probable future directions of "excessive entangle-
ment," assuming it remains a viable analytical tool, are tentatively
appraised. 4
I. ENTANGLEMENT: THE ANALYTICAL MILESTONES
As Justice Frankfurter wrote, "[a] rhythm. . . is manifest in
the history of Supreme Court adjudication."' 5 New concepts
emerge gradually as older perspectives are found wanting or as
new societal problems find their way into the judicial system.
Once these new strains of thought take hold, they go through a
process not entirely unlike the process of natural selection. Some
demonstrate a robust vitality and broad applicability over a long
time span. Others are of only temporary import and soon either
disappear or are subsumed in another analytic framework. Dis-
1. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). In Regan, the
Court upheld a New York state statute which directed payment to non-public schools
of the costs they incurred in complying with certain state-mandated requirements,
including requirements as to testing and as to reporting and recordkeeping. See dis-
cussion at text accompanying notes 100-09 infra. In concluding the majority opinion,
Justice White wrote:
This is not to say that this case, any more than past cases, will
furnish a litmus-paper test to distinguish permissible from impermissi-
ble aid to religiously oriented schools. But Establishment Clause cases
are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among our-
selves, perhaps reflecting the different views on this subject of the peo-
ple of this country. What is certain is that our decisions have tended to
avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches at either end of
the range of possible outcomes. This course sacrifices clarity and pre-
dictability for flexibility, but this promises to be the case until the con-
tinuing interaction between the courts and the States-the former
charged with interpreting and upholding the Constitution and the latter
seeking to provide education for their youth-produces a single, more
encompassing construction of the Establishment Clause.
2. See notes 5-143 & accompanying text infra.
3. See notes 144-86 & accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 187-245 & accompanying text infra.
5. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court, reprinted in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE
SUPREME COURT 448, 454 (P. Kurland ed. 1970). The original version was published
in 1934 in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 474. The later version was pre-
pared for publication in the Hansard Society's ASPECTS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
33 (1950).
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cernment of the "rhythm" of the "excessive entanglement" con-
cept is therefore vital in assessing its present impact on church-
state questions and in attempting to forecast future developments.
A. The Early'Development
Although its roots can be easily identified in earlier cases,
6
the "excessive entanglement" test was first explicitly articulated in
Walz v. Tax Commission.7 There, the Court was confronted with
an establishment clause challenge to a New York State constitu-
tional provision and its implementing statute which granted tax
exemptions to religious organizations for property used for reli-
gious, educational, or charitable purposes. 8 In an opinion for the
Court, the newly-installed Chief Justice, having concluded that
the "legislative purpose of the property tax exemption is neither
the advancement nor the inhibition of religion . . . neither spon-
sorship nor hostility,"9 went on to "be sure that the end result-
the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion." 0 Noting that exempting churches from taxation involved
less governmental involvement than taxing them"I and that the
practice of granting exemptions enjoyed widespread historical ac-
ceptance in the United States, 12 he concluded that "[t]here is no
genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of reli-
gion." 13
In Walz, the Court's excessive-entanglement analysis could
easily have been construed as simply a pragmatic rephrasing of
the "primary effect" test,' 4 which required that the primary effect
of legislation neither advance nor inhibit religion. ' 5 The follow-
6. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., con-
curring); id. at 265 (Douglas, J., dissenting); School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 429 (1962) (majority opinion by Black, J.); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 228 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 26-27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
7. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
8. Id. at 666, 667 n.l.
9. Id. at 672.
10. Id. at 674.
11. 1d. at 674-75.
12. Id. at 675-80. The Chief Justice quoted Justice Holmes' famous remark in
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921), that "a page of history is
worth a volume of logic." 397 U.S. at 675-76.
13. 397 U.S. at 675.
14. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). For a more complete ex-
planation of the "primary effect" test and its relationship to the "primary purpose"
test see note 17 infra.
15. See text accompanying note 10 supra. Under this interpretation the Chief
Justice may be said to be using excessive entanglement as a measure of whether the
primary effect of the statute is to advance or inhibit religion-the greater the entan-
glement, the greater the possibility that the statute is advancing or inhibiting religion.
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ing Term, however, through the pen of the same Justice, the Court
made clear in Lemon v. Kurtzman ' 6 that "excessive entanglement"
was a hurdle separate from and additional to the "purpose-effect"
test. 17
In this second "excessive entanglement" case, the Court was
confronted with challenges to Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
statutes that provided "state aid to church-related elementary and
secondary schools."' 8 The Pennsylvania statute authorized the
state to reimburse non-public schools directly for expenditures for
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional material. 19 Reim-
bursement was limited to expenditures for certain "secular" sub-
jects which were also taught in the public schools. To obtain
reimbursement, the private school officials were required to main-
tain accounting procedures that identified the separate cost of the
secular educational service and to submit those accounts to state
audit.
The Court began its analysis by listing the three tests devel-
oped by prior cases in the area: the secular purpose test, the pri-
mary effect test, and the excessive entanglement test.20 After
summarily determining that the plan did not have the advance-
ment of religion as its purpose,21 the Court passed over the "pri-
mary effect" test 22 and struck down the statutory scheme as
involving "excessive entanglement between government and reli-
gion. ' 23 Acknowledging that total separation of church and state
is impossible, the Court described the "line of separation" 24 as be-
Paradoxically, this use of excessive entanglement became more pronounced after the
concept became an independent part of the establishment clause test. See text accom-
panying notes 64-73 infra.
16. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). A second decision was issued in this case affirming the
district court's handling on remand. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) [Lemon'
HI]. Except as otherwise noted, all discussion of Lemon in this Article refers to the
first Supreme Court decision in this case.
17. In School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Jus-
tice Clark synthesized the "purpose-effect" test as follows:
If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitu-
tion. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Id. at 222. See also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). A particularly
graphic early application of this test is set forth in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 444-45 (1961) (upholding the Sunday closing laws of Maryland).
18. 403 U.S. at 606.
19. 403 U.S. at 609 n.3.
20. Id. at 612-13.
21. Id. at 613.
22. Id. at 613-14.
23. Id. at 614.
24. Id.
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ing "far from. . . a 'wall.' ",25 Rather, said the Chief Justice, it is
"a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship. ' 26 He then undertook
to determine whether the entanglement was excessive by examin-
ing the character and purposes of the benefited institutions, the
nature of the aid provided by the state, and the nature of the re-
sulting relationship between the government and the religious au-
thority.27 The Court concluded:
The history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy
indicates that such programs have almost always been accom-
panied by varying measures of control and surveillance. The
government cash grants before us now provide no basis for pre-
dicting that comprehensive measures of surveillance and con-
trols will not follow. In particular the government's post-audit
power to inspect and evaluate a church-related school's
financial records and to determine which expenditures are reli-
gious and which are secular creates an intimate and continuing
relationship between church and state.
28
The Rhode Island statute,29 also in issue, permitted supplemental
salary payments to non-public school teachers of secular subjects.
The Court similarly concluded that the state aid, "carefully condi-
tioned . . . with pervasive restrictions," would require "compre-
hensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" to
ensure that the legislature's restrictions were obeyed. This surveil-
lance would involve an "excessive and enduring entanglement be-
tween Church and state."
'30
The Court next considered what it termed a "broader base of
entanglement": the "divisive political potential" 3' of these aid
programs. Echoing the thoughts of Justice Harlan in his separate
concurrence in Walz 32 and the oft-cited commentary by Professor
Freund, 33 it set forth several sentences that may well occupy a
great deal of judicial attention in the future:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous
or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our
democratic system ...but political division along religious
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 615.
28. Id. at 621-22.
29. 1969 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 246, § 1 (formerly codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-
51-1 to -9 (Supp. 1970) (repealed 1980).
30. 403 U.S. at 619. The Court explained the need for such restrictions by noting
that "[u]nlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent
and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations
imposed by the First Amendment." Id.
3 1. Id. at 622.
32. 397 U.S. at 695.
33. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969).
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lines was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect. . . .The potential divi-
siveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political
process.3 4
Assistance programs such as the ones in issue, concluded the
Court, would "tend to confuse and obscure other issues of great
urgency" 35 since pressure for increased assistance would inevita-
bly follow. Significantly, this assessment was principally an his-
torical judgment.36 While the tax exemptions of Walz would
cause no political divisiveness, aid programs to schools could not
rely upon such historical acceptance.
37
Even these early cases 38 clearly demonstrate the most signifi-
cant direct effect of this "excessive entanglement" concept on reli-
gion clause jurisprudence. They introduce into religion clause
analysis what can best be termed a "prophylactic dimension."
Administrative relationships between religious and civil authori-
ties are forbidden not only when they result in government sup-
port or direction of religious enterprises but also when they are
"pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction" 39 of
such enterprises. This "prophylactic dimension" thus also seeks to
safeguard one of the root values protected by the religion
clauses-"strife avoidance."'40 Relationships which might cause
34. 403 U.S. at 622 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 622-23.
36. The Court noted that, unlike the historically-accepted tax exemption at issue
in Wa/z, the funds at issue here would be the subject of annual appropriations and
would benefit relatively few religious groups. "Political fragmentation and divisive-
ness on religious lines are thus likely to be intensified." Id. at 623.
37. Id. at 624:
38. In a companion case, Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Court
upheld provisions of the Higher Education Facilities Act, id. at 674, which made
available federal grants to private colleges for the construction of facilities to be used
for purposes other than religious instruction or activities. Again, attention focused on
the entanglement concept. Deliberately rejecting the term "test" (used in Lemon) in
favor of "guideline," id. at 678, the Court found three differences between this case
and Lemon: first, college students are less impressionable than elementary and high
school students; second, the subject matter of the courses affords the religiously-ori-
ented teacher less opportunity for indoctrination; third, the aid is non-ideological in
character and constitutes a one-time grant. Not only do these factors reduce the pos-
sibility of excessive administrative entanglement, concluded the Court, but they also
preclude serious problems of political divisiveness. Id. at 685-88.
39. 403 U.S. at 620.
40. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting):
Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, educational or
other, brings the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of sect
against sect for the larger share or for any. Here one by numbers alone
will benefit most, there another. That is precisely the history of societies
which have had an established religion and dissident groups. . . . It is
the very thing Jefferson and Madison experienced and sought to guard
against, whether in its blunt or in its more screened forms. . . . The
[Vol. 27:11951200
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religiously-based disputes are forbidden-whether or not any real
friction between the church and the civil state is actually present.
Underlying this criterion is the assumption that when reli-
gious and civil society operate at close quarters the "flash point"
for discord is particularly low.41 To avoid impairing either the
proper workings of government or the vitality of religion, the con-
tact points between the two must be drastically limited both quan-
titatively and qualitatively. When the relationship of religion and
government becomes a matter of political debate, there is a special
danger of interfering with the normal workings of the political so-
ciety. An atmosphere is created, the Court assumes, which either
"could divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that
confront every level of government" 42 or could result in "political
power intruding into the legitimate and free exercise of religious
belief."'43
The introduction of "excessive entanglement" into traditional
establishment clause analysis in Walz and Lemon clearly height-
ened, at least conceptually, the proverbial "wall of separation."
While Lemon rhetorically characterized the "wall" as "a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier,"44 it also emphatically described
the "excessive entanglement" concept as tending "to confine
rather than enlarge the area of permissible state involvement with
religious institutions. ' 45 The objective was "to prevent, as far as
possible, the intrusion of either into the precincts of the other."
46
B. The Rhythm Unfolds
Walz 47 and Lemon 48 introduced the "excessive entangle-
ment" concept into establishment clause analysis. 49 This develop-
mental plateau having been reached, however, the rhythm of
doctrinal growth changed markedly as the Court integrated the
new concept into the pragmatics of decision making. Indeed, "ex-
cessive entanglement" was not very prominent when the Court re-
turned to the religion clauses in the 1973 Term.
end of such strife cannot be other than to destroy the cherished liberty.
The dominating group will achieve the dominant benefit; or all will em-
broil the state in their dissensions ....
41. See Wa/z, 397 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("programs, whose very
nature is apt to entangle the state in details of administration and planning, may
escalate to the point of inviting undue fragmentation").
42. 403 U.S. at 623.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 614.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
48. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
49. See note 38 & accompanying text supra.
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While "excessive entanglement" figured in three cases, it was
the basis of decision in only one, Hunt v. McNair.50 There the
Court engaged in no real doctrinal innovation. Its holding was
fact-specific; it simply found that a South Carolina bond financing
arrangement which benefited church-related colleges did not pro-
duce "excessive entanglement." 5'
In the other two cases, Committeefor Public Education v. Ny-
quist52 and Sloan v. Lemon 53 the "excessive entanglement" was
not the basis for decision. Nyquist did demonstrate, however, an-
other significant attribute of the "excessive entanglement" con-
cept. There, the Court dealt with several New York statutes
54
which provided for direct monetary grants to "qualifying" non-
public schools for maintenance and repair, tuition reimbursement
for parents whose children attend non-public elementary and sec-
ondary schools, and a tax deduction plan for parents failing to
qualify for the tuition reimbursement plan. In declaring these
programs violative of the establishment clause, Justice Powell,
speaking for the Court, relied principally on the "primary effect"
test.5 However, although it was not necessary to address the mat-
ter, he deliberately paused to note that the aid program posed
"grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense of continu-
ing political strife over aid to religion."' 56 Referring to the opinion
of his predecessor, Justice Black,57 in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion,58 Justice Powell declared that "competing efforts to gain or
maintain the support of government" 59 by religious groups have
precipitated "competition among religious sects for political and
religious supremacy" 60 and "occasioned considerable civil
strife." 61 Aid programs, continued the Justice, become entrenched
and "generate their own aggressive constituencies. ' 62 When this
50. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
51. Id. at 745-49. The Court relied principally on Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971), described in note 38 supra.
52. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
53. 413 U.S. 825 (1973). Sloan was decided the same day as Nyquist and was
found to be indistinguishable from it. Id. at 830.
54. 413 U.S. at 762 n.7, 764 n.12, 765 n.17.
55. Id. at 779, 783.
56. Id. at 794.
57. Justice Black retired effective September 17, 1971. Justice Powell was com-
missioned on December 9, 1971 and took his oath and seat on January 7, 1972. 404
U.S. at III-IV. For an early analysis of the similarities in their judicial philosophies
see Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 MICH. L. REV.
445 (1972).
58. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
59. 413 U.S. at 796.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 797.
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phenomenon is juxtaposed with the deeply emotional area of
church-state relationships, "the potential for seriously divisive po-
litical consequences," concluded the Justice, "needs no elabora-
tion."63
These 1973 Term cases, in addition to emphasizing that "ex-
cessive entanglement" was well-established as an independent
"prophylactic" criterion in establishment clause jurisprudence,
also stressed that the test could have a significant effect on the
Court's implementation of one of the other prongs of the tradi-
tional analysis, the "primary effect test." For instance, speaking of
"political entanglement" in Nyquist, Justice Powell wrote that
while such problems alone may not be sufficient to "warrant the
invalidation of state law,"' 64 they did constitute a "warning sig-
nal" 65 of other pitfalls under the "purpose" or "effect" standards.
"Excessive entanglement" thus assumed another role as an "early
warning system" for more traditional establishment clause hur-
dles.66
This secondary role for "excessive entanglement" has signifi-
cant conceptual and practical consequences which could shift the
axis of religion clause jurisprudence. There is some indication
that, with the aid of its new-found warning light, the Court may
consider more charitably the relevance and probity of evidence
submitted on the question of primary effect. 67 For instance, while
the indications are admittedly far from clear, the "excessive entan-
glement" concept appears to have had precisely that effect in Meek
v. Pittenger.68 Despite the precedent of an earlier decision uphold-
ing a strongly analogous textbook loan scheme,69 the Court
demonstrated a new rigidity and, in an opinion by Justice Stewart,
struck down the direct loan of institutional materials and equip-
ment to non-public schools on "primary effect" grounds. Justice
Stewart distinguished this loan from the textbook situation on the
grounds that, while textbooks were loaned to students, the mate-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 798.
65. Id.
66. The Court may well have foreseen this dual role for "entanglement" in the
earlier cases. The "warning light" metaphor of Justice Powell in Nyquist was taken
directly from the opinion of the Court in Lemon where the majority had noted that
"[als well as constituting an independent evil ... involvement or entanglement be-
tween government and religion serves as a warning signal." 403 U.S. at 624-25.
67. In Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973), a companion case
to Nyquist, the Court struck down a New York statute providing reimbursement to
parochial schools for certain expenses incurred in administering examinations and in
recordkeeping. It based its finding of unconstitutional effect partially on the fact that
teachers might use the funds to support religious educational activities. Id. at 480.
68. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
69. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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rial at issue here was loaned directly to the schools. Furthermore,
he noted, seventy-five percent of the non-public schools qualifying
for the twelve-million-dollar aid package were church-related in-
stitutions.70
However, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his separate
opinion, the textbook program approved in that earlier decision
also required the close cooperation of the non-public schools at-
tended by the students to whom the loans were made.71 Further-
more, while the percentage of non-public schools receiving loans
of instructional material under the particular act in question was
high, public schools received the same assistance under other stat-
utes. Therefore, the non-public schools comprised a much lower
percentage of the total recipients of such aid from the state.72 As
Justice Stewart had noted several pages earlier in Meek, "it is of
no constitutional significance whether the general program is
codified in one statute or two."'73
An explanation for Justice Stewart's holding must therefore
be found elsewhere. One significant clue is his willingness to find
an unconstitutional "primary effect" without direct proof that it
does in fact exist. He simply assumes that the combination of
what he characterizes as pervasively religious schools and the sig-
nificant amount of the aid will inevitably produce such an illicit
relationship between the state's aid program and the school's ad-
ministration. It is that "entanglement" to which he seems to ob-
ject.
Meek had another and far more direct role in the develop-
ment of the "rhythm" 74 of the "excessive entanglement" concept:
it constituted the high water mark in the application of the test. In
assessing the constitutionality of "auxiliary services" 75 made
available to non-public school pupils in their own facility, the
Court, explicitly relying on the entanglement test of Lemon, held
that the district court had erred "in relying entirely on the good
70. 421 U.S. at 362-66. The Court permitted a textbook loan to stand on the
authority of Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 421 U.S. at 359-62.
71. 421 U.S. at 391 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(referring to Board of Educ. P. Allen).
72. Id. at 389-90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Id. at 360 n.8 (majority opinion).
74. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
75. "Auxiliary services" included:
counseling, testing, and psychological services, speech and hearing ther-
apy, teaching and related services for exceptional children, for remedial
students, and for the educationally disadvantaged, and such other secu-
lar, neutral, non-ideological services as are of benefit to nonpublic
school children and are presently or hereafter provided for public
school children of the Commonwealth.
421 U.S. at 352-53.
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faith and professionalism of the secular teachers and counselors
functioning in church-related schools to ensure that a strictly non-
ideological posture is maintained. ' 76 The precautions required to
ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role "necessarily
give rise," asserted Justice Stewart, "to a constitutionally intoler-
able degree of entanglement between church and state."' 77 As in
Lemon, the discussion of administrative entanglement was sup-
plemented by an assertion of the danger of political entanglement
resulting from the prospect of "repeated confrontation between
proponents and opponents of the auxiliary-services program" 78 in
the annual appropriations process.
This rigid insistence on keeping public and religious educa-
tors at arms' length was curiously tempered by a footnote notation
that diagnostic speech and hearing services do not present the
same entanglement problem as the other auxiliary services and
"seem to fall within that class of general welfare services for chil-
dren that may be provided by the State regardless of the inciden-
tal benefit that accrues to church-related schools."' 79  This
recognition-however grudging-that the policy considerations of
the entanglement theory must, at some point, meet the head winds
of equal protection was somewhat reinforced by the separate
opinion of the Chief Justice.8 0 Having authored the strong "sepa-
ratist" language of Walz and Lemon, he now not only stressed the
equal protection limitations on "excessive entanglement" but
noted that, in denying equal protection, the Court might also en-
croach upon free exercise values:
Affluent parents, by employing private teaching specialists, will
be able to cope with this denial of equal protection, which is,
for me, a gross violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights, but
all others will be forced to make a choice between their judg-
ment as to their children's spiritual needs and their temporal
need for special remedial learning assistance. One can only
hope that, at some future date, the Court will come to a more
enlightened and tolerant view of the First Amendment's guar-
antee of free exercise of religion, thus eliminating the denial of
equal protection to children in church-sponsored schools, and
take a more realistic view that carefully limited aid to children
is not a step toward establishing a state religion-at least while
this Court sits.8 1
This mid-period in the development of the "excessive entan-
glement" concept was thus characterized by a reinforcement of the
76. Id. at 369.
77. Id. at 370.
78. Id. at 372.
79. Id. at 371 n.21.
80. Id. at 386-87 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. Id. at 387 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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key "prophylactic dimension," the consequent development of the
concept's secondary role as a warning signal for more basic estab-
lishment clause difficulties, and, finally, the seminal realization
that this amorphous concept had to be limited in some principled
fashion to avoid head-on conflicts with other constitutional con-
siderations. Justice Frankfurter's "rhythm" was unfolding.
C. The Development of a Shorthand
When the Court again made what was fast becoming an an-
nual visitation to establishment clause jurisprudence, it entered
the new stage in the development of the "excessive entanglement"
concept foreshadowed by the footnote in Meek8 2 and the separate
opinion of the Chief Justice. 83 Fortunately, at least for the Court,
the case at hand, Roemer v. Board of Public Works84 was a com-
paratively comfortable one with which to make such a transition.
There, the Court sustained noncategorical grants to private insti-
tutions of higher learning. The statute in question explicitly re-
quired that such funds not be used for sectarian purposes. After
rehearsing the past cases and confirming the applicability of
Lemon's three-part test, 85 the Court acknowledged that it had
reached a new plateau in the development of establishment clause
jurisprudence. In a characteristic display of candor, Justice Black-
mun frankly stated that the Court saw "little room for further re-
finement of the principles" 86 and set out not "to unsettle those
principles . . . or to expand upon them substantially, but merely
to insure that they are faithfully applied in this case."' 87 His ensu-
ing "excessive entanglement" analysis, while acknowledging that
the process was not an "exact science,"'88 was exceptionally loyal
to that goal. The findings of the district court89 were rigidly ana-
lyzed against the characterizations of institutions and of civil-reli-
gious relationships articulated in Tilton v. Richardson.9
82. See note 79 & accompanying supra.
83. See notes 80-81 & accompanying text supra.
84. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
85. Id. at 748-54.
86. Id. at 754.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 766.
89. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 426
U.S. 736 (1976).
90. 426 U.S. at 761-67. See note 38 supra. The aided institutions, concluded the
Roemer majority, were not so pervasively sectarian as to require the Court to scruti-
nize the conduct of specific educational programs for ideological indoctrination. 426
U.S. at 762. The Court found that, although these grants were not "one-time, single
purpose" grants, the district court's finding that audits would be "quick and non-judgmental" was supportable, and further, that the process was "not likely to be any
more entangling than the inspections and audits incident to the normal process of the
colleges' accreditations by the State." Id. at 763-64. Similarly-and significantly-
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Attitudinally, the Court seemed bent on avoiding the rigid tone of
Meek. Doctrinally, the Court was in a "holding pattern."
When it made its next annual pilgrimage to this area in Wol-
man v. Walter,9' the Court demonstrated to an even greater de-
gree than in Roemer a propensity to rely on the factual
characterizations developed in the earlier cases. Indeed, the Court
quite pointedly declined to undertake any reassessment of the
"standard religious profile" 92 of the schools in question and in-
stead seemed relieved that, like the district court, it was able to
conclude that " 'the character of these schools is substantially
comparable to that of the schools involved in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man.' "93 In terms of the doctrinal development of the "excessive
entanglement" concept, the analysis was clearly a summing up of
what had gone before, not an attempt to break new ground. In-
deed, the Court reapplied and reemphasized the policy concerns
developed in the early cases. For example, both the "prophylactic
dimension" and the close conceptual affinity of "entanglement"
and "effect" were evident when it voided provisions in the Ohio
Code94 which permitted state provision of field trip "transporta-
tion and services" 95 to non-public schools. The Court held that,
under the "effect" test, the "field trips are an integral part of the
educational experience, and where the teacher works within and
for a sectarian institution, an unacceptable risk of fostering of reli-
gion is an inevitable by-product. '96 It then went on, with citation
and quotation from Lemon, 97 to hold also that the close supervi-
sion of non-public teachers necessary to ensure secular use of field
trips would create "excessive entanglement."98
the Court also accepted the findings of the district court that there was no substantial
danger of political entanglement. It relied upon the facts that the recipient was a
college with a "diverse and widely dispersed" student constituency, id. at 765 (quoting
Tilton, 403 U.S. at 688-89), that the recipients involved a wide variety of schools,
"more than two-thirds of which had no religious affiliation," id., and that any contro-
versy surrounding the aid program was not likely to involve the Catholic Church
directly but only the management personnel of the institutions involved, id.
91. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
92. Id. at 235 n.4. The Court's footnote may be read as intimating that all appel-
lees acquiesced in the application of the "standard religious profile." The brief of the
private appellees indicated, however, that while they preferred a disposition that did
not rest on such a profile, they also argued that the schools in question were distinctly
different from those in Lemon. Id. (citing Brief for Appellees Grit et al. at 13-14,
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)).
93. Id. at 235 (quoting district court in the case, 417 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (N.D.
Ohio 1976)).
94. Id. at 252.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 254.
97. Id.
98. The Court upheld supplying standardized examinations to non-public school
students under a scheme which did not involve the non-public school teacher in either
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When the ink dried on Wolman, the development of the "ex-
cessive entanglement doctrine" in establishment clause jurispru-
dence appeared to have reached a semipermanent resting place.99
Its basic features-"prophylactic" function, warning light for the
"purpose" and "effect" tests-had been articulated and applied.
An attempt had been made to integrate the concept into constitu-
tional jurisprudence by reconciling the methodology with other
constitutional considerations. After struggling with the amor-
phous nature of the concept, the Court had fallen back on its ini-
tial formulations and its original factual assumptions and applied
the resulting characterizations in almost litmus-test fashion.
D. The Beginning of the End?
The Court celebrated the decennial year of the "excessive en-
tanglement" test by handing down an opinion which may mark
the beginning of a new stage in establishment clause analysis. At
the pen of Justice White-no enthusiastic supporter of the "exces-
sive entanglement" testl°°-the Court, in Commilteefor Public Ed-
the testing or the scoring of the examination. Since the non-public school did not
control "the content of the test or its result," id. at 238, 240, there was no danger of its
use for religious instruction or for "excessive entanglement." Similarly, the Court
attempted to deal with the problem of reconciling entanglement and other constitu-
tional considerations by substantially reinforcing the diagnostic-therapeutic distinc-
tion for auxiliary services originally made in the Meek v. Pittenger footnote. See 421
U.S. at 371 n.2 1. The distinction was justified on the probable subject matter content
of the contact between the student and the diagnostician. Unlike teaching and coun-
seling, diagnostic services, noted the Court, "have little or no educational content and
are not closely associated with the educational mission of the nonpublic school."
They provide opportunity for "limited contacts" only between the diagnostician and
the child. Moreover, that time is basically devoted "to the use of objective and profes-
sional testing methods." 433 U.S. at 244.
99. The "excessive entanglement" concept was again applied in an establishment
clause context in New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977). A New
York statute provided reimbursement to sectarian schools for certain state-required
services. In April 1972, these payments were ruled unconstitutional by a district
court. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Levitt, 342 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). New
York then passed a statute purporting to authorize reimbursement for the 1971-72
school year. In Cathedral Academy the Court held the second statute unconstitu-
tional. The Court distinguished Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (Lemon
I), which had permitted religious schools to retain payments received before Lemon
I, on the ground that, in this case, the injunction of the district court expressly en-
joined payments for amounts "heretofore ... expended." Thus the statute purported
to modify the federal court's injunction, 434 U.S. at 128-30 (emphasis supplied by the
Court). The Court also noted that a detailed audit in the state court of claims to
determine whether any funds were used for sectarian purposes "would constitute a
significant encroachment on the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." 434 U.S. at 132.
100. See Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-70 (1976)
(White, J., concurring); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 821-22
(1973) (White, J., dissenting).
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ucation v. Regan,' °" sustained under the now-traditional three-
pronged Lemon formula a New York statute that authorized pub-
lic reimbursement of sectarian non-public schools for the costs of
administering state-required and state-prepared tests and for com-
plying with the reporting requirements of state law. 102 Relying on
its sanction of a similar Ohio scheme in Wolman v. Walter,10 3 the
Court found that the statute had a secular purpose and effect. The
fact that, unlike the Ohio situation, some of the tests were graded
by the teachers was found to be without constitutional significance
since these teachers could not control the content of the examina-
tion. Similarly, the existence of a direct cash reimbursement to
the religious school did not invalidate the scheme since the statute
provided for the maintenance of specific safeguards to insure that
such reimbursements covered only secular services.
The Court then turned to the "excessive entanglement" test to
inquire whether the maintenance of separate accounts for reim-
bursable expenses and their audit by state authorities rendered the
scheme constitutionally infirm. It found the reimbursement proc-
ess to be "straightforward and susceptible to the routinization that
characterizes most reimbursement schemes.' °4 Justice White
then added that "[o]n its face, therefore, the New York plan sug-
gests no excessive entanglement, and we are not prepared to read
into the plan as an inevitability the bad faith upon which any fu-
ture excessive entanglement would be predicated."'' 05
Earlier cases had professed a similar refusal to attribute bad
faith to private school teachers. These cases had often assumed,
nevertheless, the inevitability of impermissible entanglement."
°6
By contrast, here the Court refused to indulge such assumptions.
This refusal of the Court to assume the inability of civil and reli-
gious authorities to engage in simple business arrangements is re-
inforced by its somewhat gratuitous statement that, after Wolman
and Regan, Meek v. Pittenger0 7 should not be read as assuming
that the religious character of sectarian schools necessarily makes
all state assistance to their sectarian activities suspect.1
0 8
Immediately following this caution, Justice White indicated,
as noted previously, 0 9 the probability of further doctrinal revision
in the establishment clause area. It would be premature to pre-
101. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
102. Id. at 648.
103. 433 U.S. at 238-41.
104. 444 U.S. at 660.
105. Id.
106. See text accompanying notes 16-98 supra.
107. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
108. 444 U.S. at 661. See text accompanying notes 67-73 supra.
109. Note I supra.
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dict, solely on the basis of Regan's cautious language, that the ex-
cessive entanglement test has lost its vitality. Clearly, however, it
celebrated a subdued anniversary. The Court demonstrated, at
least, an awareness of the problems associated with the continued
use of the test and, indirectly, its impact on the jurisprudence of
the religion clauses.
E. A Doctrinal Transplant.- Entanglement and Free Exercise
As "excessive entanglement" in the context of classical estab-
lishment clause analysis was settling into a rather "automated"
pattern, the concept became recognizable in another context-the
free exercise clause. Of course, in a very real sense, traditional
free exercise analysis has long included what may be termed an
"entanglement" concept even though that terminology never re-
ally became part of regular professional parlance. In a long line
of cases, beginning with Watson v. Jones"0 and culminating in
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich III and Jones v. Wolf, "1 2
American courts have forbidden, on free exercise grounds, the in-
volvement of civil courts in disputes which, while superficially
civil, require resolving questions of religious dogma or disci-
pline. 13 The basic rationale of these cases was simply stated in
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral:'"4 religious freedom encom-
passes the "power [of religious bodies] to decide for themselves,
free from state interference, matters of church government as well
as those of faith and doctrine."' ' 5
During the last few Terms, however, the Court has articu-
lated an "excessive entanglement" approach in free exercise cases
which seems to bear many of the same characteristics and to foster
many of the same policy considerations as the establishment
clause variety of Walz, Lemon, and their progeny. In this setting,
"excessive entanglement" has been suggested as a reason for re-
stricting activity of church personnel which would abnormally ob-
struct the political process; in short, it has operated as a defense to
110. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
111. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
112. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
113. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), does recognize, however, the possibility of
a civil court's determining questions of church ownership by resort to "neutral princi-
ples" not requiring review of matters of doctrine. In one sense, as noted by the dis-
sent, id. at 610, this holding can be viewed as a rather moderate position with respect
to "entanglement" dangers. From another perspective, however, it must be noted that
the Court stressed that it would not tolerate even partial reliance on matters of reli-
gious doctrine and polity in applying these "neutral principles." Id. at 605. Notably,
it left undisturbed the pronouncement of Mifivojepich that even "marginal" review of
allegations of arbitrariness by church tribunals was forbidden. Id. at 609 n.8.
114. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
115. Id. at 116.
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a free exercise claim."l 6 It has also been given as a reason for
restricting government action that might hamper the freedom of
ecclesiastical officals; here, it has acted as a measure of the free
exercise claim." 17
The first of these two approaches appeared in McDaniel v.
Paty.1 8 There, the Court confronted a Tennessee constitutional
provision and statute which disqualified ministers from serving as
legislators.119 In a plurality opinion, 12 0 the Chief Justice, joined
by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, first asserted that the
minister's free exercise rights were not absolute,' 21 since the stat-
ute operated against the minister because of his status and not his
belief. However, his "activity" still enjoyed significant free exer-
cise protection that could be outweighed only by " 'interests of the
highest order.' 122 Tennessee had asserted that its interest in
preventing the establishment of religion was "of the highest or-
der." ' 23 The plurality found, however, that since "the American
experience provides no persuasive support for the fear that clergy-
men in public office will be less careful of antiestablishment inter-
ests or less faithful to their oaths of civil office than their
unordained counterparts," 124 it was not even necessary to evaluate
the legitimacy of the professed legislative objective.
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall (at least one of
whose votes was necessary to the Court's judgment) saw no real
distinction between one's beliefs and one's calling to the ministry.
Consequently, they concluded, in the words of Justice Brennan,
that
[Tihe State's goal of preventing sectarian bickering and
strife may not be accomplished by regulating religious speech
and political association. The Establishment Clause does not
license government to treat religion and those who teach or
116. See notes 118-28 & accompanying text infra.
117. See notes 129-38 & accompanying text infra.
118. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
119. Id. at 621. Article 9 § I of the State Constitution disqualified ministers from
serving as legislators. The state legislature applied this provision to candidates for
delegate to the State's 1977 limited constitutional convention when it enacted ch. 848,
§ 4, of the 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts.
120. Justice Blackmun did not participate in the decision or consideration of this
case.
121. Torcaso v. watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), had established an absolute prohibi-
tion against "the historically and constitutionally discredited policy of probing reli-
gious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or perhaps
more properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious concept."
Id. at 494. (footnote omitted).
122. 435 U.S. at 628 (plurality opinion) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 629 (footnote omitted).
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practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive
of American ideals and therefore subject to unique disabiLi-
ties. 125
In McDaniel, the Court's basic analysis followed the tradi-
tional free exercise pattern of measuring the free exercise claim
against an asserted important government interest. The asserted
government interest here was to prevent entanglement of church
and state in the civil law-making function of the legislature, and
the concomitant "sectarian bickering." 26 In nullifying the statute,
the Court found that this asserted interest was not sufficiently im-
portant to justify an infringement of the minister's free exercise
rights. This result is clearly in harmony with the tradition of
favoring free exercise claims against asserted establishment clause
concerns. 127 However, the plurality's methodology in reaching
that result must prompt some serious reflection as to whether, in
other contexts, the balance between the two clauses would still be
struck so readily in favor of giving free exercise concerns some
"breathing space." While perhaps simply a demonstration of ju-
dicial restraint in deciding the case as narrowly as possible, the
plurality's strong reliance on the history of the benign participa-
tion of clergy in our legislature may indicate that, absent such a
tradition of easy accommodation, entanglement values will not be
treated quite so perfunctorily when weighed against free exercise
claims. 128
The "excessive entanglement" analysis arose again in another
free exercise context during the last Term of Court. In NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 129 the Court held that church-oper-
ated schools teaching both religious and secular subjects were not
within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act. Thus,
church officials could not be compelled to recognize or to bargain
with unions organized by lay teachers in the parochial schools.
The case involved five regular Catholic high schools in the diocese
125. Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring). While not joining Justice Brennan's
opinion, Justice Stewart wrote separately and expressed the same basic reasoning. Id.
at 642-43 (concurring opinion).
126. Id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring).
127. Recognizing the symbiotic relationship of the two clauses, the Court has, over
the years, shown a pronounced tendency to favor free exercise values over marginal
establishment clause concerns. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 296-98 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). See generally L. TRIBE, AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14-4 to -6 (1978).
128. Such a reliance on history may also explain why, in regard to the supply of
more modern social services, the Meek Court showed little concern for the argument,
made by one Justice in a separate opinion, that a "crabbed attitude" toward classify-
ing "auxiliary services" as permissible "general welfare" services had severe free exer-
cise as well as equal protection implications. 421 U.S. at 385-87 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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of Fort Wayne-South Bend, and two secondary schools in the
Archdiocese of Chicago that were once preparatory seminaries
but which, in recent years, had been open to students "having a
potential for the priesthood or for Christian leadership."
30 When
unions petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
for certification as exclusive bargaining representatives for the lay
teachers in these schools, the Board sustained jurisdiction over the
petitions on the ground that, while its policy was to decline juris-
diction over "completely religious" organizations, entities which
were simply "religiously associative" were properly within its au-
thority.
The Supreme Court, affirming the court of appeals' denial of
enforcement of the NLRB order,' 3' held--on statutory grounds-
that the National Labor Relations Act did not grant the NLRB
jurisdiction over church schools that teach both religious and sec-
ular subjects. In essence, the Court reasoned that to construe the
Act to include such schools would present "a significant risk that
the First Amendment [would] be infringed." 32 Reciting the "reli-
gious profile" of parochial schools developed in Lemon, Meek,
and Wolman and the "key role played by teachers in such a school
system,"' 33 the Justices concluded that "[g]ood intentions by gov-
ernment--or third parties--can surely no more avoid entangle-
ment with the religious mission of the school in the setting of
mandatory collective bargaining than in the well-motivated legis-
lative efforts consented to by the Church-operated schools which
we found unacceptable in Lemon, Meek, and Wolman.'
34
Therefore, in the absence of a clear intention by the Congress to
include parochial school teachers within the Board's jurisdiction,
the Court declined to construe the Act in such a way as to place in
question its constitutionality.
The Court explicitly noted that the appellate court had con-
cluded that both the free exercise clause and the establishment
clause foreclosed the Board's jurisdiction.' 35 In its own opinion,
the Court also continually referred to "the Religion Clauses"'
136
and did not present a separate analysis of the case under each of
the two clauses. Certainly, both clauses are implicated. For in-
stance, if the Act had been construed to cover the parochial
schools in question, the NLRB would arguably have been re-
130. Id. at 492.
131. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), aft'd,
440 U.S. 490 (1979).
132. 440 U.S. at 502.
133. Id. at 501.
134. Id. at 502.
135. Id. at 496.
136. Id. at 499-500.
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quired to determine the orthodoxy of the views of teaching per-
sonnel. 37 Sustaining the governing bishop would arguably
implicate the establishment clause. On the other hand, sustaining
the teachers would arguably impair the free exercise rights of the
bishop. 38
That the Court realized that this case could be viewed from
the perspective of either of the religion clauses is not excep-
tional. 39 What is noteworthy is its assumption that the policy
concerns of both clauses can be viewed through use of the entan-
glement concept. In one sense, the use of this standard makes
more sense in the free exercise area than in establishment clause
analysis. Its use in the former would at least be compatible with
the Court's long tradition of interpreting free exercise protections
as broadly as possible. 40 However, the Court itself showed no
particular sensitivity to this factor and instead seemed to assume
that "excessive entanglement" was simply a standard equally ap-
plicable to both of the religion clauses. This articulation of the
free exercise interest through "excessive entanglement" terminol-
ogy emphasizes the dominant theme of the earlier cases: prophy-
lactic separation of the religious and civil elements of society. It
also suggests the possibility that the Court views the two Clauses
as expressing the common theme of separation. Jefferson's "wall"
may indeed be higher than it was a decade ago.
137. The court of appeals noted:
We are unable to see how the Board can avoid becoming entangled in
doctrinal matters if, for example, an unfair labor practice charge fol-
lowed the dismissal of a teacher either for teaching a doctrine that has
current favor with the public at large but is totally at odds with the
tenets of the Roman Catholic faith, or for adopting a lifestyle accepta-
ble to some, but contrary to Catholic moral teachings. The Board in
processing an unfair labor practice charge would necessarily have to
concern itself with whether the real cause for discharge was that stated
or whether this was merely a pretextual reason given to cover a dis-
charge actually directed at union activity.
559 F.2d at 1125, aft'd, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
138. In its free exercise aspects, the Court's analysis fits comfortably within the
traditional patterns. The case is logically consistent with the Watson-Serbian Ortho-
dox line of cases since, ifjurisdiction had been sustained, the NLRB would have been
required to pass upon matters of educational policy in the process of determining the
rights of organized teachers. Similarly, the Court's analysis can be viewed as involv-
ing the traditional balancing of free exercise claims and the police power.
139. The "natural antagonism between a command not to establish religion and a
command not to inhibit its practice," see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 849 (1978), so prominent in the state action
cases, see, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), is
not obvious in state regulation cases. Regulation can be beneficial as well as oppres-
sive and thus constitute, depending on the particular context, either an aid to religion
or an inhibiting factor. In either instance the state has ceased to be neutral toward
religion.
140. See L. TRIBE, supra note 127, § 14-5, at 824 & n.5.
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F. The Rhythm-A Summary
Up to this point, the scope of the inquiry has been strictly
confined: to perceive the "rhythm" of the Court in the develop-
ment of the "excessive entanglement" concept.
The past decade has seen the "excessive entanglement" con-
cept serve two basic purposes in establishment clause analysis.
First, it has become a separate and independent hurdle which a
statutory scheme must pass to be sustained against an establish-
ment clause challenge. As such, entanglement has added a new
"prophylactic" dimension to establishment clause analysis. Rela-
tionships which tend to produce government support of religious
enterprises or tend to endanger religious-civil peace are forbidden
before the "flash point" is reached. As a practical matter, exces-
sive entanglement has significantly lowered the burden of proof
required to support a claim that a statutory scheme has the "pri-
mary effect" of establishing a religion. In short, under establish-
ment clause analysis, "preventive separation" of the religious and
civil entities of our society-without more-has become a recog-
nizable value in constitutional jurisprudence.
Moreover, this emphasis on separation has also manifested
itself in the suggestion that "non-entanglement" is a government
interest to be weighed against a free exercise claim. "Excessive
entanglement" has also been used to articulate a free exercise
claim-a claim thus found to be ripe even before any actual gov-
ernment attempt to interfere with religious practices.
Consequently, despite dicta to the contrary throughout the
cases, 14 ' there has been a decided reemphasis by the Court of the
Madisonian view that both religious and secular interests are best
advanced when each leaves the other completely unfettered. 142 As
a result, despite the warning of Walz that "[t]o equate the two
[clauses] would be to deny a national heritage with roots in the
Revolution itself,"143 there appears to be a tendency on the part of
the Court to regard the religion clauses as expressing a single pol-
icy consideration of separation.
141. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973) ("It
has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separa-
tion. ... ); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("Our prior holdings do
not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible
in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organiza-
tions is inevitable."); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) ("The course of
constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line. ... ). See
also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977).
142. See Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, in 2
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (G. Hunt ed. 1901), quoted in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (appendix). See also L. TRIBE, supra note
127, § 14-3.
143. 397 U.S. at 673.
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At the same time, the long-term vitality of this trend is open
to question. The Court's latest decision in Regan suggests a cer-
tain mistrust of at least the practical implications of excessive en-
tanglement and a general willingness to reassess the present tests
of establishment clause violations. Any such reassessment will
have to take into consideration two additional factors: first, the
practical utility of further use of the entanglement concept; and
second, the probable impact of its continued use on those areas of
American life which have been the traditional areas of concern
under the religion clauses. These two considerations are treated in
the sections that follow.
II. ENTANGLEMENT: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEST
In addition to recognizing its impact on the constitutional
policy of the religion clauses, 44 the Supreme Court will have to
consider, in any general reassessment of the "entanglement test,"
the practical problems inherent in its implementation. Even if the
Court is willing to accept the policy directions to which it leads, a
test not susceptible to fair and moderately efficient judicial man-
agement is a poor candidate for retention and a substitute must be
sought.
A. The Problem.- Judicial Subjectivity
The practical problem inherent in the entanglement test can
be rather simply stated. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 145 the Court set
forth a three-pronged inquiry to determine the existence of exces-
sive entanglement. The relevant factors are: (1) the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, (2) the nature of the
aid that the State provides, and (3) the resulting relationship be-
tween the government and the religious authority. 146 In any con-
text, determining the "character and purpose of the institutions"
and "the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority" would involve an evaluative process far more
subtle than simple fact-gathering. In such situations, the Justices
enter the world of the subjective where their evaluation is subject
to forces "seldom fully in consciousness. . . [but]. . . so near the
surface. . that their existence and influence are not likely to be
disclaimed . . . . Deep below consciousness are other forces, the
likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the
complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions,
which make the man . . .. ,,47 Such subjectivity or reference to
144. See Part I supra.
145. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
146. Id. at 615.
147. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921).
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"constitutional facts" outside the record has always been a part of
constitutional litigation.' 48 Indeed, its role has always been espe-
cially pronounced in religion clause litigation. As Justice Jackson
noted in McCollum v. Board of Education,149 the Justices are often
left with "no law but [their] own prepossessions."' 150
However, the excessive entanglement test invites a whole new
degree of subjectivity and thus represents, in a very real sense, the
ultimate defeat of attempts to use neutral principles to interpret
the religion clauses. 15 Here, "the character and purpose of the
institutions" and "the resulting relationship between the govern-
ment and the religious authority" must be assessed not simply to
ascertain proof of a primary effect to foster religion but to deter-
mine the more nebulous issue of the probability of such an effect
taking place in the future. In short, the "prophylactic dimension"
of the test requires a whole new degree of judicial subjectivity.
For example, to implement the entanglement analysis it had
mapped out for itself, the Lemon Court had to make certain fun-
damental judgments about the religiously affiliated schools in-
volved in the litigation and about the probable resulting
relationship between the schools and the civil government. For
part of that inquiry, it could rely on the finding of the district
court that the parochial schools constituted "an integral part of
the religious mission of the Catholic Church."'' 52 However, the
Justices had no basis in the record for concluding that "a dedi-
cated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or
her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably expe-
rience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral."', 53 In-
deed, as Justice White pointed out in dissent, the most direct
evidence of record was to the contrary. 154 Similarly, the Court's
148. See Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SuP. CT. REV.
75. See also P. BREST, PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 894-953
(1975).
149. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
150. Id. at 238 (Jackson, J., concurring).
151. See, e.g., P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE
AND THE SUPREME COURT (1962).
152. 403 U.S. at 609 (quoting DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 117 (D.R.I.
1970)).
153. Id. at 618.
154. Id. at 667 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White noted:
The Court points to nothing in this record indicating that any partici-
pating teacher had inserted religion into his secular teaching or had had
any difficulty in avoiding doing so. The testimony of the teachers was
quite the contrary. The District Court expressly found that "[tihis con-
cern for religious values do,s not necessarily affect the content of secu-
lar subjects in diocesan schools. On the contrary, several teachers
testified at trial that they did not inject religion into their secular classes,
and one teacher deposed that he taught exactly as he had while em-
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conclusion that the administrative arrangement set up to imple-
ment the required audit system was "pregnant with the dangers of
excessive government direction of church schools" 55 is a conclu-
sion not grounded in the district court's findings.
Meek v. Pittenger156 provides an even better example of the
subjectivity inherent in the "excessive entanglement" analysis.
There, despite trial court findings to the contrary, 57 the Court
held that the "auxiliary services" provisions of the Pennsylvania
statute would cause "excessive entanglement" because "a teacher
remains a teacher, and the danger that religious doctrine will be-
come intertwined with secular instruction persists."' 158
When the Court turns to an assessment of "political entangle-
ment," an even greater opportunity for reliance on the subjective
is present. An assessment of how politics and religion will mix in
any given political environment necessarily involves a personal
judgment based in large part on the Justice's own political experi-
ence, observation, and, possibly, tolerance for the methods of a
particular religious sect. It is a judgment easily swayed by the
contemporary political climate and by the influences of regional-
ism from which no member of the Court entirely escapes.
In short, by requiring the Justices to predict the probability of
unconstitutional effect, the entanglement test has introduced an ab-
normally high degree of judicial subjectivity into the Court's as-
sessment of the nature of religious institutions and of the
relationships which those institutions develop with governmental
entities. The degree of entanglement deemed "excessive" often
appears to be the product of personal judgments about certain re-
ligions and their institutions by a decision-maker who may or may
not have any real exposure to the particular sect in question. The
Justices have often based their conclusions on factual assumptions
upon which the record is either silent or to the contrary. 159
B. History-the Unsuccessful Restraint on Subjectivity
The Court itself seems to have sensed the difficulty of this
subjective approach. For the Justices who originally framed this
ployed in a public school. This testimony gains added credibility from
the fact that several of the teachers were non-Catholics.
155. Id. at 620 (majority opinion).
156. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
157. 374 F. Supp. 639, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("The notion that by setting foot inside
a sectarian school a professional therapist or counselor will succumb to sectarianiza-
tion of his or her professional work is not supported by any evidence."). See also
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 392 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.)
158. 421 U.S. at 370.
159. See notes 152-58 & accompanying text supra.
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tool of religion clause adjudication, a good deal of its potential for
the subjective was to be curbed by recourse to the lessons of his-
tory. Justice Harlan, specially concurring in Walz, wrote that
"[wlhat is at stake as a matter of policy is preventing that kind and
degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history
teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political
system to the breaking point."' 60 This same theme was relied
upon by the Chief Justice when, in the same case, he repeated
Justice Holmes' oft-quoted comment that " 'a page of history is
worth a volume of logic.' "161 Indeed, history was probably the
determinative factor in both Walz and Lemon. While the prop-
erty tax exemption of Walz was a practice deeply embedded in
our national life, the aid schemes at issue in Lemon could claim
no similar historical roots. 162 The whole notion of political divi-
siveness was, as Justice Harlan's comment presaged, especially
rooted in lessons drawn by the Justices from their reading of
American history. As the Chief Justice wrote in Lemon:
It conflicts with our whole history and tradition to permit ques-
tions of the Religion Clauses to assume such importance in our
legislation and in our elections that they could divert attention
from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level
of government. . . . The history of many countries attests to
the hazards of religion's intruding into the political arena or of
political power intruding into the legitimate and free exercise of
religious belief.16
3
After the initial cases, however, history was apparently not
often a factor in the Court's treatment of the entanglement con-
cept-to the chagrin of one of its architects, the Chief Justice.
164
The Court's use of entanglement in the later cases 6
5 relied to a
160. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 675-76 (opinion of the court) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
162. 403 U.S. at 624 ("We have no long history of state aid to church-related edu-
cational institutions comparable to 200 years of tax exemption for churches.").
163. Id. at 623.
164. For instance, in Meek v. Pittenger, the Chief Justice found the Court's hold-
ing with respect to the entanglement possibilities of the auxiliary services (see discus-
sion accompanying notes 80-81 supra) "extravagant." 421 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). He argued that "there is no basis in 'expe-
rience or history' to conclude that a State's attempt to provide. . . the remedial assist-
ance necessary for all its children poses the same potential for unnecessary
administrative entanglement or devisive political confrontation which concerned the
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra." Id. at 385-86 (quoting Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 802). The Chief Justice also dissented from that part
of the Court's opinion in Wolman v. Walter which struck down field trips partially on
the ground that such assistance would constitute excessive entanglement. 433 U.S. at
255. There the Court had not asserted any historical basis for its decision.
165. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736 (1976).
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great degree on the factual stereotypes developed in the earlier
cases, but not upon the history, to explicate the consequences of
aid in such circumstances. 66 In a sense, then, the methodology
was cut from one of its principal intellectual moorings. Before
urging that the line be once again fastened, however, it seems ap-
propriate and fair to ask whether history can realistically serve as
an accurate guide in measuring the possibility of modem-day en-
tanglement.
While the history of the religion clauses may be somewhat
helpful in establishing certain basic doctrinal propositions about
the nature of the constitutional guarantees, the precise contours of
the protection contemplated by the framers seem to have eluded,
rather systematically, courts and scholars. 67 Clearly, as Justice
Brennan noted in School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp,'68 in the area of church-state relations "an awareness of
history and an appreciation of the aims of the Founding Fathers
do not always resolve concrete problems."' 69 What little discus-
sion did take place among the framers presupposed a world far
different from that in which modem religion clause adjudication
takes place. As Professor Giannella emphasized in his seminal ar-
ticle,' 70 the relationship of church and state must change as our
notions of the role of the civil state and of the role of religion
change. Significantly, the changes that have taken place in both
those notions directly bear on the usefulness of the "excessive en-
tanglement" concept. On the one hand, civil government today is
hardly the government of limited concern and responsibility with
which the framers were acquainted. At the same time, contempo-
rary American religious practices have become more "associa-
tional," more "community service oriented."' 7' Indeed, today the
term "religion" must, for constitutional purposes, be made to in-
clude many groups whose focus is decidedly more anthropocentric
than theocentric.172
166. See text accompanying notes 84-99 supra. See also Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment. Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1967).
See also Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REV. 53,
55-58 (1946).
168. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
169. Id. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring).
170. Giannella, supra note 167, at 1382: "This concept [church/state separation]
must be continually reformulated if it is to adapt to changing ideas concerning the
types of human experience encompassed by the term 'religion' and the kinds of action
within the proper domain of the state."
171. See L. TRIBE, supra note 127, § 14-1.
172. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11 (1967). See also United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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These very pronounced shifts in the nature of both civil gov-
ernment and religion have, quite obviously, drastically increased
the opportunity for "overlap"' 73 or "entanglement" between the
two. At the same time, however, the dangers inherent in such an
"overlap" have apparently diminished with time. Justice Powell
emphasized this point when, despite his usual high regard for the
place of history in constitutional analysis, he remarked in Wol-
man:
At this point in the 20th Century we are quite far removed
from the dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Es-
tablishment Clause in the Bill of Rights .... The risk of sig-
nificant religious or denominational control over our
democratic processes--or even of deep political division along
religious lines is remote . ... 174
In short, greater overlap in church-state functions may mean more
entanglement but not necessarily more excessive entanglement.
C. A Substitute for History---the Standard Profile
The Court's use of a standard profile'75 of religious institu-
tions appears to have compounded rather than resolved the prob-
lem. As the doctrinal analysis set out in the first part of this
Article indicates, 76 beginning with the cases in October Term
1974 the Court exhibited a progressively more pronounced ten-
dency to avoid in-depth exploration of individual facts concerning
particular religious institutions and the consequences of their rela-
tionships with particular government entities. 77 Simultaneously,
it also displayed a distinct unwillingness to reexamine its earlier
characterizations of the types of institutions and relationships that
had been before it previously and now surfaced in similar, al-
though not identical, forms. Instead, there was an increased reli-
ance on the stereotypical institutional "profiles" constructed in the
173. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Observed Justice Frankfurter:
As the state's interest in the individual becomes more comprehensive,
its concerns and the concerns of religion perforce overlap. State codes
and the dictates of faith touch the same activities. Both aim at human
good, and in their respective views of what is good for man they may
concur or they may conflict.
Id. at 461-62.
174. 433 U.S. at 263.
175. See note 92 & accompanying text supra.
176. See notes 68-99 & accompanying text supra.
177. A particularly graphic example of the Court's lack of interest in the trial rec-
ord occurred in Meek v. Pittenger, where the testimony at trial not only failed to show
the possibility of entanglement with respect to "auxiliary services" but affirmatively
indicated the feasibility of the arrangement contemplated by the statute. See, e.g.,
Appendix at 50-62, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (testimony of Dr. William
D. Boesenhofer); id. at 64-70 (testimony of Ms. Pauline Stopper); id. at 70-81 (testi-
mony of Mr. David Horowitz).
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early cases. In effect, characterizations previously given certain
religious institutions or certain religious-civil relationships in ear-
lier cases became presumptively conclusive. For instance, in the
later "parochaid" cases, the institutions and relationships at issue
were measured against the "givens" apparently established once
and for all in Lemon and Tilton. Similarly, the Court's conclusion
in Meek that Pennsylvania's "auxiliary services" scheme ran afoul
of the entanglement test was largely based upon its conclusion in
Lemon despite the fact that the cases involved a distinctly differ-
ent religious-civil relationship. I7 8 The Court's conclusions about
political divisiveness in the same programs rested heavily on its
earlier characterizations in both Lemon and Nyquist. Indeed, by
the time of Wolman v. Walter,179 the Court's analysis not only
showed little independent evaluation of the relationships involved
but even manifested a preference for deciding church-state issues
by reference to these standard profiles.
Reliance on earlier developed models, "profiles," and charac-
terizations has several important implications. Quite obviously, it
drastically reduces the chance for later reappraisal or even refine-
ment by the Court itself. First impressions become lasting ones
and, at a time when the country's religious life is undergoing sig-
nificant change, 8 0 later parties have little opportunity to improve
178. The aid scheme at issue in Lemon basically contemplated parochial school
officials' accounting for the expenditure of public funds for sectarian activities and
raised the possibility of disputes over whether a given activity under the control of
parochial school teachers was sectarian. 403 U.S. at 615-622. In Meek, the Common-
wealth's personnel would have entered the parochial schools to provide the "auxiliary
services" encompassed within the program. Involved, therefore, was the surveillance
of state personnel and the possibility of disputes between the parochial school and
Commonwealth officials over the proper scope of their duties with respect to these
auxiliary services. 421 U.S. at 372.
179. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
180. Significantly, many of these changes in the country's religious life directly
affect church-state relationships. For instance, with respect to Catholic schools, the
subject of many of the "entanglement test" cases, there was, according to the research
of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, a
decline of one-third in the enrollment of Catholic children of primary and secondary
age in parochial schools between 1964 and 1974. A. GREELEY, THE AMERICAN
CATHOLIC 167-69 (1977). Most of that decline was apparently due to the unavail-
ability of places and not to any lack of confidence on the part of Catholics in the role
of those schools. Id. During the same time, however, most schools experienced a
pronounced increase in the proportion of lay faculty members as religious teachers
became more and more scarce. See, e.g., ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF CLEVE-
LAND, FACING THE FUTURE: CATHOLIC SECONDARY EDUCATION IN THE DIOCESE
OF CLEVELAND, summarized in Catholic High Schools.- A Local Study, 9 ORIGINS 717,
722-23 (1980). In some areas, apparently due to shifting populations, the percentage
of non-Catholic students enrolled in such schools also dramatically increased.
There has also been a significant increase in the participation of organized reli-
gions in the country's political life. See, e.g., Statement of the National Council of
Churches on the Resumption of Draft Registration, in 9 ORIGINS 608, 608-09 (1980);
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the Court's understanding of contemporary developments in this
complex area. As the lower federal and state courts become more
aware of the Supreme Court's tendency to rely on the past's con-
ventional wisdom, they will have no real incentive to explore in
any depth the particular facts of any given religious-civil relation-
ship. From the viewpoint of lower court judges, it will be safer to
rely on the evaluations already given similar, but by no means
identical, facts and relationships in earlier Supreme Court
cases.' 81 Indeed, there is some indication that that process has al-
ready taken hold. In Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 18 2 for
instance, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's earlier
description in the "parochaid" cases of the parochial schools as
pervasively religious institutions. 183
Statement of General Secretary of the United States Catholic Conference on Unemploy-
ment and Government Policy Before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities,
in 9 ORIGINS, 738, 738-39 (1980). However, this increased participation of religious
organizations in political affairs has taken place in an atmosphere of renewed
ecumenism which may well reduce the possibility of religiously-based political strife.
See, e.g., Joint Statement of Pope John Paul 11 and Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios I of
Constantinople, in 9 ORIGINS 418 (1979); Brooklyn Guidelines for Catholic-Jewish
Weddings, 9 ORIGINS 506 (1980) (guidelines issued for the Diocese of Brooklyn); Ro-
man Catholic-Lutheran Commission, Statement on the Augsburg Confession, in 9 OR-
IGINS 685, 685-89 (1980).
181. See, e.g., Wolman v. Essex, 417 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub. nom. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), where the district
court concluded that "[a]lthough the stipulations of the parties evidence several sig-
nificant points of distinction, the character of these schools is substantially compara-
ble to that of the schools involved in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-618 ....
(1971)" Id. at 1116. Yet, the court also noted that the stipulations with respect to the
Catholic schools presented a situation very unlike the situation in Lemon, 403 U.S. at
615-19. In the schools at issue in Wolman, almost 70% of the teachers were lay teach-
ers. Although a majority were Catholic, they included members of almost all reli-
gious faiths. Non-Catholic children were not required to attend classes on religion.
Most religious teachers did not wear religious garb. Secular courses were taught basi-
cally as they were in the public schools. 417 F. Supp. at 1116. The entire stipulation
is also set out in Appendix at 30-33, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
182. 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), a ffd, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
183. 559 F.2d at 1120-23. Similarly, many other court decisions have employed
these standard profiles. Eg., the now generally accepted "fact" that elementary and
secondary parochial schools are pervasively religious was adopted in Public Funds for
Pub. Schools of N.J. v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979) (invalidating the statute in
question on "primary effect" grounds), afl'dmem. 442 U.S. 907 (1979); Committee for
Pub. Educ. v. Levitt, 461 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afdsub. nom. Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980); McMormick v. Hersch, 460 F.
Supp. 1337 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (reaching a result similar to that in Catholic Bishop of
Chicago); Members of Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt, 427 F. Supp. 1338
(D.R.I. 1977); Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Benton, 413 F.
Supp. 955 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (invalidating statute on "primary effect" grounds); Amer-
icans United for Separation of Church & State v. Board of Educ., 369 F. Supp. 1059
(E.D. Ky. 1974) (voiding "dual enrollment" contracts on "primary effect" grounds);
Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Paire, 359 F. Supp. 505
(D.N.H. 1973) (voiding "dual enrollment" contracts on "entanglement" grounds);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified,
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Of course, it can be argued that this reliance by the Court on
earlier characterizations has at least one salutary implication: it
has brought a degree of predictability to the church-state area (a
factor of great consolation to Justice Brennan in Wolman). 184
However, this beneficial "fallout" is of minimal compensation
when weighed against the possibility that, in an era of rapid and
subtle change both in government and in religion, the admittedly
delicate balance between the two will be resolved largely on the
basis of stereotypes already almost a decade old. 85
D. Still Missing.- Internal Discipline
In re-evaluating the entanglement test, the Court will have to
confront the reality that, despite a decade of experience, it has yet
to find a satisfactory internal discipline which will curb excessive
judicial subjectivity. History can no longer realistically play a sig-
nificant role in assessing modern relationships between religious
and civil power. The substitute shorthand of reliance on standard
profiles is no better. It has introduced a new and unnecessary ri-
gidity into church-state relations at a time when societal needs
may well require a more sensitive scrutiny of religious-civil rela-
tionships.
While the Court has recently demonstrated a heightened
awareness of these difficulties, 86 it has yet to decide how-or
whether-it will adjust its doctrinal course to take these shortcom-
ings into account. In confronting this issue, the Court will no
doubt turn, as this Article does now, to how a test, with the ideo-
logical bias described in Part I and the practical difficulties de-
scribed in this Part, may affect the direction of the religion clauses.
III. ENTANGLEMENT: ITS FUTURE PATH
It has always been particularly difficult to predict future
413 U.S. 756 (1973); Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1970), aJJ'd, 403
U.S. 955 (1971).
Likewise, Supreme Court differentiation between parochial elemen-
tary/secondary schools on one hand and institutions of higher learning on the other
in terms of religious permeation has been automatically accepted in lower court deci-
sions. See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Blanton, 433
F. Supp. 97 (M.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803 (1977); Lendall v. Cook, 432 F. Supp.
971 (E.D. Ark. 1977); Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Bubb,
379 F. Supp. 872 (D. Kan. 1974).
184. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
185. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting):
"It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires.
But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon
unfounded assumptions about how people live."
186. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). See text
accompanying notes 100-09 supra.
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trends in religion clause jurisprudence. As Professor Choper
noted in his own attempt 87 seventeen years ago, the earlier warn-
ing of John Cortney Murray is bound to have a "chilling effect"
on any effort in this regard:
No one who knows a bit about the literature on separation
of church and state, that for centuries has poured out in all lan-
guages, will be inclined to deny that hardly another problem in
the religious or political order has received so much miscon-
ceived and deformed statement, with the result that the number
of bad philosophies in the matter is, like the scriptural number
of fools, infinite.188
That "chilling effect" is substantially compounded by the Chief
Justice's caution in Walz against reliance on sweeping utterances
in opinions when considering church-state questions upon which
the Court has not yet squarely passed.
8 9
The future pattern of development of "excessive entangle-
ment" is, of course, even less amenable to prediction. As indi-
cated in the earlier parts of this Article, its inherent subjectivity is
exacerbated by the Court's failure to identify any effective method
of internal discipline in its application. Consequently, the "per-
sonal predilections"'' 90 of the Justices soon become part of the
"conventional wisdom" of religion clause jurisprudence.
Another serious problem impedes any effort to predict future
trends in this area. The particular situations which are likely to
come before the Supreme Court in the future are only now emerg-
ing and have not been refined in the crucible of lower court litiga-
tion or in the legislative or administrative process.' 9' In the case
of many of these potential issues, the developmental process has
progressed sufficiently to permit assessment of the potential mag-
nitude of the problems they raise. It can now be said with some
certainty that the "excessive entanglement" concept has at least
the potential for both altering the basic axis of church-state rela-
tions and affecting, in subtle but significant ways, other constitu-
tional freedoms.
A. "'Divisiveness" and Other First Amendment Rights
The cases already decided by the Court make it quite clear
that the concept of "excessive entanglement" is grounded in an
assumption that one of the basic values protected by the religion
187. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools:. A Proposed Constitutional Standard,
47 MINN. L. REV. 329 (1962).
188. Id. at 329 (quoting Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 23 (1949)).
189. 397 U.S. at 670-72.
190. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 237-44 infra.
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clauses is the avoidance of strife between the religious and civil
components of American society. Essential to that assumption is
the judgment that religiously motivated activity has a particularly
grave potential for causing discord in the civil society. Since the
early cases, there has been some cause for significant concern that
these general principles might carry slow-germinating doctrinal
seeds which, at a future time, would suggest a reappraisal of the
traditionally privileged place of political and associational rights
of religious institutions and individual citizens motivated by reli-
gious principles.
To some members of the original Walz-Lemon majority, the
existence of this potential at this point in the development of the
test would probably seem strange indeed. They apparently felt it
had been laid to rest in those early cases. For instance, in Walz,
the Chief Justice went out of the way to remark that
[a]dherents of particular faiths and individual churches
frequently take strong positions on public issues .... Of
course, churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens
have that right. No perfect or absolute separation is really pos-
sible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involve-
ment of sorts--one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid
excessive entanglement. 192
Indeed, this comment, coupled with the warning, compliments of
Justice Cardozo, about "the tendency of a principle to expand it-
self to the limit of its logic,' 1 93 ought to have put the matter to
rest. Certainly American historical experience reveals that
churches and church groups have long exerted powerful political
influence on legislation at both the national and state levels. 194
However, other dicta, especially in the discussion of "political
divisiveness," has kept the issue alive. For instance, in Lemon, the
majority cautioned:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous
or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our
democratic system ...but political division along religious
lines was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect . . .The potential divi-
siveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political proc-
192. 397 U.S. at 670.
193. Id. at 678-79 (quoting B. CARDOZO, supra note 147, at 51).
194. For example, the general secretary of the United States Catholic Conference
testified before the Democratic National Convention's Platform Committee on such
diverse topics as hunger and malnutrition, health care, housing, racial integration in
public education, communications, criminal justice, foreign aid, human rights, Mid-
dle East policy, and African policy. Statement of the Most Reverend Thomas C. Kelly,
Secretary, United States Catholic Conference, before the Democratic Platform Comm.
(1980). This report is summarized in The Long Island Catholic, June 19, 1980, at 4,
12.
1226 [Vol. 27:1195
ENTANGLEMENT TEST
ess . . . .To have States or communities divide on the issues
presented by state aid . . . would tend to confuse and obscure
other issues of great urgency .... 195
The Court also exhibited a certain apprehensiveness in its ap-
proach to the situation posed in McDaniel v. Paty.196 While the
Court found that concern for the entanglement caused by a single
minister's sitting in the state legislature was insubstantial, the plu-
rality appeared somewhat cautious in confirming across the board
the political equality of religiously based activity. The reassuring
language of Walz was noticeably absent and the possibility of the
Court's reacting differently to less conventional ecclesiastical par-
ticipation in civil matters was haunting. The chance of such a
later interpretation of McDaniel certainly did not escape Justice
Brennan, who, in a separate concurring opinion, 197 stressed that
the political rights of religiously-oriented elements in our society
were entitled to the same protections as those of other members.
When McDaniel is read in conjunction with other recent ac-
tions of the Court, a sense of insecurity about future trends with
respect to the political expression rights of religiously-oriented
groups and individuals lingers. For instance, the Court's willing-
ness in Buckley v. Valeo '98 to balance such government interests
as "the actuality and appearance" of corruption against personal
freedoms of political speech and association in sustaining both the
contribution limitations and the disclosure and record-keeping
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act' 99 may well in-
dicate an increased readiness to "balance" such freedoms against
other "important interests," including, perhaps, a concern against
establishment of religion expressed in entanglement terms. For
some, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v. Wade,2°° in strin-
gently limiting those areas where the state might regulate abor-
tion, was partially motivated by a concern to keep the civil state
and its decision-making process untainted 20' by the "highly
charged and distinctly sectarian religious controversy that the
abortion issue had predictably come to stir."'202
195. 403 U.S. at 622-23.
196. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
197. Id. at 629-42.
198. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Quite surprisingly, Justice Brennan joined the Court's
opinion in Buckley. But cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 349-71 (1976) (opinion of
Brennan, J.) (concluding that governmental interests in efficiency and the political
loyalty of employees are insufficiently significant to sustain the practice of condition-
ing the retention of public employment on the employees' support of the "in-party").
199. 424 U.S. at 6 n.l.
200. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
201. Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term-Forward Toward a Model of Roles in
the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1973).
202. Id. at 22.
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On the other hand, the use of the "entanglement" concept as
a limitation on freedom of expression has found little support
among scholars. Indeed, at least one commentator who originally
seemed to see some workability in the theory has now apparently
given more weight to the caution of Walz. 203 This prudence by
the Court and commentators is, no doubt, due in part to a realiza-
tion of the danger of chipping away at freedom of expression and
in part to the significant free exercise implications in any restric-
tion on the speech or associational rights of religious bodies or
those affiliated with them. Indeed, the ensuing political and social
isolation of religious groups could, paradoxically, lead to even
greater divisiveness and to the creation of new, religiously-based
"discrete and insular minorities."
2°4
Beyond McDaniel, "excessive entanglement" has thus shown
little promise of gaining any significant respectability as an impor-
tant government interest capable of restricting political rights.
However, "entanglement," especially "political entanglement,"
also serves, according to Lemon and Nyquist, as a "warning sig-
nal" of other establishment clause problems.20 5 This influence of
the political divisiveness argument on the "purpose" and "effect"
tests has not been overlooked by present-day litigators. Statutes
whose sole purpose is to enforce a particular religious doctrine
have been held to violate the Establishment Clause. 2°6 Since the
advent of the "excessive entanglement" concept, plaintiffs attack-
ing legislation which has the prominent support of a religious
group have taken a new tack. The goal appears to be not so much
to convince the Court that the legislation ought to be voided on
this ground (that the legislation is the product of political pressure
by a political group) alone but to prevail on "purpose" or "effect"
grounds without having to demonstrate that the "sole" 20 7 reason
for the enactment was to legislate the religious doctrine of a given
faith. Proponents of this argument regularly acknowledge, as did
203. Compare Tribe, note 201 supra, with L. TRIBE, supra note 127, § 14-12, at
867.
204. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
See also P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 83-85 (1964); Tribe, supra
note 201, at 24.
205. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
206. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Court voided an Arkansas
statute which prohibited the teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution "for the sole
reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with a
particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group." Id.
at 103 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that no suggestion was made that
the law could be justified "by considerations of state policy other than the religious
views of some of its citizens." Id. at 107. "It is clear," wrote Justice Fortas, "that
fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason for existence." Id. at
107-08.
207. See note 206 supra.
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the Court in Lemon, that religiously affiliated persons and ecclesi-
astical entities possess the same political rights of speech and asso-
ciation as other citizens. Their argument is that there is an
operative difference, at least for those associated with religion, be-
tween "participation" and "pressure."
For instance, in Harris v. McCrae,20 8 a class action challeng-
ing restrictions on the use of federal Medicaid funds for abortions,
the plaintiffs argued that the restrictions contained in the so-called
"Hyde Amendment" had the purpose and effect of establishing in
public law the views of a particular religion. They further submit-
ted that the amendment was unconstitutional as the product of
excessive entanglement between lawmakers and specific church
groups.209 In his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart had
little trouble holding, on the facts of the particular case, that "it
does not follow that a statute violates the Establishment Clause
because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of
some or all religions.' "210 The simple fact that "the funding re-
strictions in the Hyde Amendment may coincide with the religious
tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not, without more, con-
travene the Establishment Clause."
'21
'
By its inclusion of the phrase "without more," the Court left
open, once again, the possibility that, under certain circumstances,
religiously affiliated groups or individuals may indeed have to
tread more cautiously than others in the political arena. Precisely
what circumstances would precipitate such a restriction is left am-
biguous. There are certainly both practical and theoretical diffi-
culties with the distinction between "participation" and
"pressure" urged by the litigants in McCrae.
There are both practical and theoretical difficulties with this
approach. Practically, it would be an impossible task to distin-
guish between "participation" and "pressure." All too often
"pressure" is the label assigned by the loser to successful legisla-
tive representation efforts. On a more theoretical plane, such an
inquiry would seem to require an investigation of the legislative
process that would normally far exceed the traditional bounds of
legitimate judicial inquiry.212  Furthermore, such a standard
would hardly foster government neutrality toward the influence of
religion or religious principles in public policy decisions. Rather,
it would amount to a constitutional policy decision limiting reli-
208. 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
209. 100 S. Ct. at 2689.
210. Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
211. Id.
212. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 268
(1977).
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gion's influence on the acts of the legislature even if, in the "mar-
ketplace of ideas," religiously-oriented thought could prevail.
Beyond purely jurisprudential considerations, there is also
the imponderable as to how much considerations of "excessive en-
tanglement" have altered attitudes in other areas of national life.
It is now well established that Supreme Court decisions can and
regularly do influence public opinion drastically. 213 It thus seems
fair to ask whether, since the advent of the "political divisiveness"
concept, the other institutions of our political society have become
less hospitable to the "input" of religious groups. There are cer-
tainly concrete indications of such a trend.214 If such a develop-
ment is in fact based on supposed "excessive entanglement"
considerations, the Lemon Court's citation to Justice Cardozo's
comment about the "tendency of a principle to expand itself to the
limit of its logic"' 215 ought to provoke critical reexamination of
that trend.
As for the influence of the "excessive entanglement" test on
other first amendment rights, it is safe to assert that, to this date,
there has been no concrete doctrinal development which indicates
that the test has in fact caused the curtailment of any rights of free
expression. Indeed, it does not seem likely that the Court would
consciously take such a step. However, judicial attitudes can pro-
duce incrementally significant changes in jurisprudential direction
without an explicit doctrinal revision. From this perspective, the
plurality opinion in McDaniel and the arguments concerning reli-
gious "pressure" on legislative efforts are developments worthy of
recognition. Their presence on the contemporary litigation scene
ought to provoke serious doubts as to whether whatever benefits
the entanglement test may deliver are worth the danger to our
freedoms of expression.
B. Government Regulation and Free Exercise
As noted in the earlier parts of this Article, 216 the past several
decades have witnessed a very significant increase in the overlap
of governmental and religious functions in our society. During
this period, American religious bodies have sought increased par-
ticipation in civil affairs. Simultaneously, there has been a sub-
213. See, e.g., National Abortion Rights Action League, Public Opinion Pohs
Since the Supreme Court Decisions of 1973 1 (summarizing Lou Harris & Associates,
Inc., Harris Surveys, Spring 1972, 1973, 1975, 1976, which indicate shifting attitudes
on abortion after Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
214. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF
THE RIGHT TO LIMIT CHILDBEARING 27-43 (1975).
215. See note 193 supra.
216. See text accompanying notes 167-73 .supra.
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stantial increase in the degree of governmental regulatory control
to which churches or church organizations are potentially subject.
The statute books are replete with so-called "religious excep-
tions" which, in the past, have been the traditional device em-
ployed to obviate any free exercise problem.21 7 However, as
Professor Whelan has recently pointed out:
[diuring the last ten years, American Church leaders have be-
come increasingly concerned about governmental definitions
and regulations of churches and religious activities. A small
but growing number of religious leaders of all faiths fear that
the golden age of religious exemptions has ended. They believe
that we are already in the twilight of substantially increased
governmental regulation.
21 8
He cites in particular changes in the Internal Revenue Code
219
through the Tax Reform Act of 1969,220 which increased the im-
portance of distinctions between various forms of church organi-
zations, the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964221
and the enactment, in 1974, of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). 222 The merits or demerits of each of these
recent attempts to narrow religious exemptions and others like
them is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is important
for present purposes to assess the probable role of the "excessive
entanglement" concept in this area.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has recognized two sorts of
"religious exemptions" from state and federal regulatory schemes.
Mandatory exemptions have been those required by the free exer-
cise clause and may, in general, be defined as those which are es-
sential to ensure the continued practice of a religion but which do
not endanger a very important governmental interest.223 Permissi-
ble exemptions have been those which the state or federal govern-
ment may grant to religious activity in order to accommodate the
citizen's desire for religious activity without sacrificing an impor-
tant civil interest, actually supporting the church, or preferring
one religion over another.224 The trend in governmental regula-
tory patterns which has precipitated current church concern can
217. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (opinion of Douglas, J.).
218. Whelan, Government and the Church, 139 AMERICA, Dec. 16, 1978, at 450.
See also Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code. The Definitional Problems,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (1977).
219. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3.
220. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 492 (1971) (codified at scattered sections of the
I.R.C.).
221. Education Amendments Act of 1972, tit. IX, § 906(a), Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86
Stat. 375 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000c-6, 2000c-9 (1976)).
222. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976)).
223. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-08 (1963).
224. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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be characterized as a tendency to deemphasize free exercise val-
ues. Increasingly many statutory exceptions are viewed as op-
tional and thus subject to countervailing state concerns. The
result is fewer and more tightly drawn religious exemptions 225
which are simply not compatible with the churches' view of their
contemporary role.
The Court's recent decision in Catholic Bishop of Chicago v.
NLRB 226 may be read as providing some "breathing space" in
this ever more intimate relationship by fusing the concept of "ex-
cessive entanglement" from the establishment clause cases with
the Watson-Serbian Orthodox227 religious dispute cases. The
traditional free exercise analysis is not reformulated but "exces-
sive entanglement" is used as a descriptive tool for the identifica-
tion and appraisal of the free exercise claim. By using "excessive
entanglement" as a measure of religious impairment, the Court
also imported from establishment clause analysis the "prophylac-
tic" characteristics of that concept. Consequently, the Court may
henceforth be more willing to bar the application of a given regu-
latory scheme to religion because it has the potential for constant
interference with the activities of the religious sect.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago is, however, an easy case to "over-
read." While employing the liberal descriptive tool of "excessive
entanglement" to assess the degree of religious impairment, it also
made clear that, in the case before the Court, the degree of gov-
ernment involvement was pervasive. To fulfill its responsibilities
under the Act, the NLRB would have involved itself in "'nearly
everything that goes on in the schools.' ",228 The decision contains
no real indication that the Court would find "excessive entangle-
ment" an appropriate measure of impairment in other regulatory
situations where the scheme could be effectuated through a rela-
tively simple set of objective rules which required minimal gov-
ernment involvement in religious matters.229
225. There has also developed increased monitoring of the use of exempt status.
See, e.g., Note, The Internal Revenue Service as a Monitor of Church Institutions: The
Excessive Entanglement Problem, 45 FORDHAML. REV. 929 (1977).
226. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
227. See notes 110-11 & accompanying text supra.
228. 440 U.S. at 503.
229. It is difficult, therefore, to justify the wariness of some members of the judici-
ary with respect to deciding questions requiring a definition of religious belief because
of "excessive entanglement" concerns. See, e.g., Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co.,
464 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1979), rev'don other grounds, 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980).
See generally Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 996 (1974). But see Steeber v. Benilde-St. Margaret's High School, (47 U.S.L.W.
2308 (D. Minn. 1978). While the courts have traditionally avoided questions of the
correctness of any religious view or judgment, they have regularly decided whether, in
fact, there was a religious motivation for an action or whether a religious belief is
sincerely held. See, e.g., Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
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More significantly, Catholic Bishop of Chicago does not pur-
port to replace or even alter substantially the basic free exercise
analysis which permits even a significant regulation of religious
activity when necessary to attain an important government inter-
est. Indeed, from this perspective, Catholic Bishop of Chicago
must be considered a relatively straightforward case. Jurisdiction
over elementary and secondary schools is a rather recent expan-
sion of NLRB jurisdiction and certainly not central to its statutory
task of maintaining labor peace pursuant to the national com-
merce power. 230
More difficult cases will, no doubt, soon be before the Court,
in which the balance between free exercise concerns and the as-
serted government interest will be a closer one.23 ' At this point it
419 U.S. 1003 (1974). See also Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir.
1975), aft'd by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), vacated and remanded, 433
U.S. 903 (1977) (remanded for consideration in light of Trans World Airlines v. Har-
dison, Inc., 432 U.S. 63 (1977)), aft'd on remand, 561 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1977) (judg-
ment of the district court affirmed on remand on statutory grounds). In Cummins the
court of appeals noted in its original opinion that such a determination would not be
inconsistent with the religion clauses.
230. Note, The Religion Clauses and NLRB Jurisdiction over Parochial Schools, 54
NOTRE DAME LAW. 263, 264-68 (1978).
23 1. Illustrative of the type of case that would pose such a difficult policy choice
for the Court is the controversy over whether the Internal Revenue Service may can-
cel a church-related educational institution's exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
when the school excludes a particular race on the ground that such discrimination is
mandated by the dogma of the controlling institution. Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, No. 79-1215 (4th Cir., decided Dec. 30, 1980) (revocation of university's tax-
exempt status violates neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the first amendment).
For an in-depth treatment of this issue, see Note, The Internal Revenue Service's
Treatment of Religiously Motivated Racial Discrimination by Tax Exempt Organiza-
tions, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925 (1979). It is difficult to predict whether there will be
much additional litigation in this area, given Congress's recent refusal to allocate
funds for implementation of more effective IRS enforcement procedures. Treasury,
Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
74, §§ 103, 615, 93 Stat. 559, 562, 565-77 (1979). There are, however, cases pending in
the federal courts to compel the IRS to take more aggressive enforcement action.
Green v. Miller, No. 1355-69 (D.D.C., filed July 23, 1976) (reopening Green v. Con-
nally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), alfdmem sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997
(1971)). See also Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979); id. at 793 n.l
(explaining that Wright and Green were consolidated on August 5, 1977, but that
dismissal in Wright had no effect on the remaining issue in Green). These cases are
discussed in Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt
Private Schools, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378 (1979).
To the extent that the cancellation of exemptions is viewed as involving an ad-
ministrative weighing of the social advantages and disadvantages of a particular reli-
gion or religious practice, the rationale of Catholic Bishop of Chicago may be
persuasive. In Walz, the Court noted that "the use of a social welfare yardstick as a
significant element to qualify for tax exemption could conceivably give rise to con-
frontations that could escalate to constitutional dimensions." 397 U.S. at 674. On the
other hand, the government interest at stake in requiring that tax benefits not be used
to perpetuate racial discrimination is substantially greater than the concern protecting
the "stream of commerce" from marginal impairment of a local parochial school's
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is indeed far too early to gauge accurately the effect of the "exces-
sive entanglement" concept on the Court's future efforts to recon-
cile the demands of an ever-expanding regulatory structure and of
the free exercise clause. In all probability, the concept will not
become controlling in any such analysis since the Court has not
abandoned its traditional methodology of weighing free exercise
claims against the asserted government interest. 232 It may wel,
however, have the practical effect of increasing the burden on
those attempting to sustain a pervasive regulatory scheme by iden-
tifying, at least in theory, situations where an impairment of free
exercise rights is possible. Of course, this later role is functionally
similar to one of the roles which the concept plays in establish-
ment clause analysis.2 33 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court can
expect here the same lack of precision and the same lack of inter-
nal discipline. 234
In any general reassessment of religion clause analysis, the
Court will therefore have to confront the issue of whether, despite
its tendency to produce unacceptably high levels of subjectivity,
the test ought to play even the limited role described above in free
exercise clause analysis. In one sense, a better argument can be
made for tolerating its infirmities in this context than in the estab-
lishment clause area. Here, its "prophylactic dimension" 235 at
least contributes to the Court's long-standing tradition of giving
free exercise concerns a broad reading.2 36 On the other hand, it
seems somewhat doubtful whether the employment of "excessive
entanglement" will really contribute to a stable relationship be-
tween civil and ecclesiastical entities in our society or whether it
labor problems. See Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp.
1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977). See generally Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United
States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
The Supreme Court has long avoided deciding the constitutionality of the reli-
gious discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (1976). See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63 (1977) (case decided on statutory grounds); Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 429 U.S.
65 (1976) (affirmance by an equally divided court), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S.
903 (1977) (remanded for consideration in light of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Har-
dison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)), aft'don remand, 561 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1977) (judgment of
the district court affirmed on remand on statutory grounds). The issue may again be
presented in the near future. See Anderson v. General Dynamics, 489 F. Supp. 792
(S.D. Cal. 1980). The court held the religious accomodation section of Title VII un-
constitutional as violative of the establishment clause. The court relied in part on the
excessive entanglement test, noting "the potential for recurring litigation before courts
and government agencies concerning difficult questions of the exercise of religious
beliefs."
232. See text accompanying notes 118-38 supra.
233. See text accompanying notes 64-71 supra.
234. See text accompanying note 186 supra.
235. See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
236. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
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will simply serve to make the "wall of separation" a little less flex-
ible. Perhaps that judgment should await the experience of fur-
ther litigation.
C. Future Civil-Religious Cooperative Ventures
While the focus of most "excessive entanglement" cases has
been the religious school, our society is filled with other areas
where civil and religious activities constantly overlap. The open-
ended, ad hoc approach of the Court to the concept of "excessive
entanglement" still makes it difficult to predict how the Court
might treat other situations which it has not yet had the opportu-
nity to reduce to automatic formulae.
Most of the principal religious-civil relationships in contem-
porary American life have already passed scrutiny, implicitly or
explicitly, under the purpose and effect tests. Also, in most cases
these relationships have been part of American life for a suffi-
ciently long period to allow the civil-religious relationship to de-
velop an historical "track record." If the Court's faith in the
historical approach to entanglement situations holds, 237 new "ex-
cessive entanglement" problems may not occur. On the other
hand, if the Court does reduce its reliance on the historical ap-
proach, renewed scrutiny of traditional religious-civil relation-
ships might persuade the Court that recent developments, viewed
in the context of "excessive entanglement's" re-emphasis on sepa-
ration, have increased the possibility of civil-religious strife.
For instance, the existence of Chaplains' Corps in the various
components of the armed forces of the United States, staffed by
clergy holding the rank of commissioned officers, has long been
accepted as meeting both the purpose and the effect tests. Rein-
forcement of this conclusion is found in the fact that the scheme
also protects the free exercise rights of the citizen "called to the
colors. '238 Certainly, the Court, at least until events of the last
decade, would have found it difficult to ignore a long and trouble-
free relationship in this area between the civil and religious sectors
of society. However, the possibility for conflict became clear dur-
ing the Vietnam War when some religious congregations sug-
237. See text accompanying notes 167-74 supra.
238. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-97
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that provisions for churches and chaplains at
military establishments is a practice "the striking down of which might seriously in-
terfere with certain religious liberties" protected by the First Amendment. In that
same case, Justice Stewart pointed out that "a lonely soldier stationed at some far-
away outpost could surely complain that a government which did not provide him the
opportunity for pastoral guidance was affirmatively prohibiting the free exercise of his
religion." Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Giannella, Lemon and Tilton.
The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 147.
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gested that clergymen in uniform could not properly fulfill their
obligation to address moral issues relating to the conduct of that
war. One very large American congregation, the American Bap-
tist Convention, even took the position that the churches had a
right of "primary jurisdiction" over chaplains accused of military
offenses since, under the applicable statutes, a chaplain's commis-
sion is dependent on the continuing certification of his Church.
239
Under these circumstances, it seems unduly complacent to con-
clude that the military chaplaincy in its present form is immune
from serious attack under the "excessive entanglement" con-
cept. 240 Of course, to admit that there is potential for serious at-
tack is not to concede the validity of the arguments. There are, for
instance, the strong countervailing considerations of military exi-
gency which may indeed require that all persons accompanying
the armed forces in a support capacity be subject to the military
chain of command and to the sanctions of military discipline.
241
A very high percentage of American hospitals are under the
sponsorship of religious sects. These hospitals maintain a variety
of working relationships with agencies of the civil government.
The sponsoring religious sects no doubt benefit from these rela-
tionships in terms of the accompanying prestige and exposure to
the rest of the community. However, the benefits to that civil
community in terms of health care services are certainly far
greater. 242 Since the early case of Bradfield v. Roberts,243 the con-
stitutionality of these arrangements has not been seriously ques-
tioned. In Bradfield, the Court sustained the religious hospital's
use of land which the city had donated by refusing to "pierce the
corporate veil" of the hospital's secular charter and by declaring
239. NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1972, at 99. The focal point of the debate was the
court-martial case of United States v. Jensen, tried at the Naval Air Station, Cecil
Field, Florida. In that proceeding a Navy Chaplain, Commander Andrew Jensen,
was charged with having committed adultery with two parishioners who were naval
service dependents. The American Baptist Convention took the position that the alle-
gations should have been first presented to the Church and the Church permitted to
take disciplinary action. Id. Commander Jensen was subsequently acquitted. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 1, 1972, at 24, col. 3.
240. Katcoff v. Alexander, Docket No. 79C-2986 (E.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 23, 1979).
241. 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1976) demonstrates a congressional determination to subject
the broadest category of persons connected with the armed forces to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. But see McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361
U.S. 281 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. I1 (1955).
242. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment. Part 11, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 556-67 (1968).
It is clear that most religious sects consider their hospitals part of the religious mission
of the sponsoring church. See, e.g., UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, ETHI-
CAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH FACILITES (Sept. 1971).
243. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
1236 [Vol. 27:1 195
ENTANGLEMENT TEST
that those challenging the arrangement had the burden of proving
that the hospital's operation was for a religious purpose. Today,
the allocation of the burden of proof would be the same.244 How-
ever, the "excessive entanglement" concept would certainly make
the purposes stated in the corporate charter non-determinative.
Moreover, it is not at all difficult to foresee the possibility of a
court's finding, in light of the growing differences among religious
groups in matters of medical ethics-a disparity the Court has al-
ready noticed in another context245-that a relationship, feasible
in the past, now creates a possibility of religious strife.
Here, as in the case of the Chaplains' Corps, to note the in-
creased possibility of such a challenge under the "excessive entan-
glement" concept is not necessarily to accept the correctness of
that viewpoint. There are very strong arguments in favor of the
current accommodation. Even if the current disparity of profes-
sional viewpoints on matters of medical ethics does increase the
potential for religious strife, that possibility must be assessed in
light of the long history of cooperation between religious groups
and civil governments on medical service matters. It is reasonable
to assume that a long-term partnership can undergo stresses which
might have a far more pernicious effect in other contexts. It would
also seem appropriate for the Court to weigh the possibility of
religious strife against the actuality of the traditionally warm rela-
tionship which exists between American communities and the
hospitals which serve them. Certainly, if the entanglement con-
cept were to be applied, it would make sense for the Court to limit
wherever possible its application to the immediate stress point and
not to prohibit cooperation in other areas of medical services.
The suggestion that such traditional areas of civil-religious
cooperation might be exposed to new attack illustrates graphically
the possibilities inherent in the use of such an open-ended meth-
odology for giving meaning to the important guarantees of the re-
ligion clauses. In one sense, the existence of this potential may
have a salutary effect. It may cause religious and civil leaders to
give detailed, advance attention to the known "stress points" of
civil-religious working relationships. A demonstration that the
matter has received careful forethought and that precautionary
measures to avoid religiously-based strife have been implemented
may well be at least partially effective in keeping the Court's en-
tanglement analysis within meaningful bounds.
244. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 746-47 n.8 (1973).
245. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), for example, the Court noted the "po-
larization" of the medical profession on the issue of abortion. Id. at 143. That polari-
zation is at least partially religiously based.
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CONCLUSION
The reappraisal of the entanglement test by the Supreme
Court must necessarily involve examination from three perspec-
tives: the impact of the test on the overall doctrinal development
of the religion clauses; the practical problems inherent in the im-
plementation of the test; and the possible future developments if
the Court continues to use it.
In considering the impact of the test on the overall develop-
ment of the religion clauses, one must recognize that the underly-
ing principle protected by the "excessive entanglement" concept
has long been recognized as one of the core strengths of our demo-
cratic society. Madison recognized the theoretical necessity of
confining religion and civil government to their own respective
spheres;2 46 de Tocqueville observed the salutary consequences of
adherence to that standard.2 47 Perhaps the expanding role of civil
government and the newly-emphasized "social mission" of many
large churches has convinced those who enjoy the unique perspec-
tive of American life which membership on the Court provides248
that this value needs to be reemphasized as a significant constitu-
tional standard. There is, however, nothing in the facts of the
cases coming before the Court that would tend to support that
judgment. Indeed, as Justice Powell noted in Wolman, "[tihe risk
of significant religious or denominational control over our demo-
cratic processes--or even of deep political division along religious
lines-is remote .... *249 It is therefore conceivable that the
Court has used the "entanglement test" without much reflection
on its overall impact on the direction of religion clause jurispru-
dence.
Even if the Court is willing to accept this doctrinal impact of
the "entanglement test," the question remains, as Justice White
has reiterated recently,250 whether the articulation of this constitu-
tional value through the "excessive entanglement" concept is a
useful judicial methodology. As employed by the Supreme Court
over the past decade, it has emerged largely as a criterion without
an internal discipline. The Court is still left with little but its
"own predilections" when it comes to determining whether the in-
evitable civil-religious entanglement is in fact "excessive." The
originally conceived standard of history is helpful in assessing
246. See Madison, supra note 142.
247. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 154-55 (Mentor ed. 1956).
248. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 175 (1972): "Across the
screen each Term come the worries and concerns of the American people-high and
low-presented in concrete, tangible form." (Douglas, J., dissenting).
249. 433 U.S. at 263.
250. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767-70 (White, J., concurring).
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some of the more traditional religious-civil relationships but is of
only marginal utility in assessing newer areas of contact between
those spheres. The only alternative found by the Court has been
the quasi-codification of its early holdings into the litmus tests of
Roemer and Wolman. Judicial factual assessments of one time
and one place thus become the operative standards of constitu-
tional adjudication in the long term.
With respect to future directions, the open-ended nature of
the "excessive entanglement" concept exposes to subtle and im-
precise reassessment many other areas of constitutional adjudica-
tion. Traditional areas of church-state cooperation, long
permitted under past standards of review, now seem exposed to
reassessment on the ground that the relationship poses the danger,
although not necessarily the actuality, of future religiously-based
strife.
Even if the Court does wish to see the "wall of separation"
become a bit higher, there are serious questions as to whether it
has selected an appropriate tool. Perhaps it has simply increased
the probability that future cases will rest to an even greater extent
on the personal predilictions of current members of the Court or,
even worse, on those of past members of the Court whose predilic-
tions have become the conventional wisdom of the "standard
profiles." In short, the benefit derived from the test seems quite
remote when compared with the risks involved in using such an
undisciplined judicial methodology.
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